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Blending In While Standing Out: Selective Conformity and New Product Introduction 
in Family Firms  
 
ABSTRACT 
Research on the conformity-distinctiveness tradeoff in family firms is divided. Examining the 
product innovations of Spanish manufacturing firms between 1998 and 2012, we hypothesize 
that family and nonfamily firms conform selectively and are driven by different motivations. 
Family firms align with their closest peers to avoid social losses while nonfamily firms 
conform to firms with different attributes to pursue social gains. Moreover, propensity to 
conform leads to more substantive organizational responses in family firms. We contribute to 
understanding how family firms navigate the conformity-distinctiveness trade-off, unveil the 




Every organization faces the confluence of two competing pressures: to look like peers to 
ensure social acceptance and legitimacy, and to differentiate to gain social recognition 
(Deephouse, 1999; Zhao, Fisher, Lounsbury, & Miller, 2016; Zuckerman, 2016). This tension 
is particularly strong when multiple stakeholder groups with different goals coexist (Berrone 
et al., 2010). For example, family firms behave in a way that favors family-centered 
noneconomic goals over purely financial goals (e.g., Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Patel & 
Chrisman, 2014). While their distinctive behavior can help family firms differentiate 
themselves from their peers (e.g., Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005), external audiences may 
perceive them as “unorthodox” (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2013), risk-averse 
(Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, & Buchholtz, 2001) and less innovative than nonfamily firms 
(Bertrand & Schoar, 2006). As a result, external audiences may put family firms through 
extra scrutiny to discern their nonconformity (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006), thus increasing the 
risk of being discounted as illegitimate or penalized (Miller et al., 2013). Although this 
literature points to a heightened tension between conformity and distinctiveness in family 




The conformity-distinctiveness debate in family business research has built on two 
theoretical perspectives, namely, the behavioral agency model (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 
1998) and institutional theory (Fiss & Zajac, 2004), with different assumptions on the role of 
agency and predictions on family firm behavior. Scholars using the behavioral agency model 
emphasize internal factors, such as family control and noneconomic goals, as a main driver of 
distinctive strategic behaviors in family firms (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2007). Institutional theorists conceive agency as externally constrained by regulatory 
pressures, suggesting that as family firm choices and behaviors are particularly exposed to 
social assessments, they are more likely to conform and follow the majority to fulfil the 
expectations of external audiences (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Miller et al., 2013). Unfortunately, these two research streams have developed separately, 
with few attempts to integrate their findings. Scholars have commonly approached the 
distinctiveness-conformity tension in family firms by taking a population-level perspective of 
conformity focused on homogeneity across firms in a given industry and examining visible 
yet broad strategic decisions (e.g., Miller & Chen, 1996; Miller et al., 2013). By treating 
conformity and distinctiveness as two ends of a continuum (Deephouse, 1999), prior studies 
have overlooked the possibility that family and nonfamily firms follow different rationales to 
conform to the behavior of other firms.  
Following recent attempts to graft a more agent-based and cognitive model of firm 
responses to external pressures (e.g., Negro, Hannan, & Fassiotto, 2015; Sharkey & Bromley, 
2015) and embracing a renewed and more nuanced conceptualization of conformity 
suggesting that “acts of differentiation are acts of conformity on dimensions of difference 
used by an audience” (Zuckerman, 2016), the original question on the conformity-
distinctiveness tension in family firms can be resolved by focusing on who family firms 
conform to and what level of commitment they show in responding to external pressures 
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compared to their nonfamily counterparts. Drawing on these insights, we suggest that family 
members’ specific concerns with family-centered noneconomic goals – including deriving a 
sense of identity from the firm, receiving social acceptance and recognition, maintaining 
reputation, and enjoying status in the field (Berrone et al., 2010; Kotlar & De Massis, 2013) – 
engender different rationales to conform to the behavior of other firms to avoid social losses, 
but also greater motivation and commitment to engage in legitimized behaviors to solidify the 
firm’s social standing in the eyes of external constituents.  
Specifically, we argue that firms conform selectively by modulating their propensity to 
conform depending on the categorical affiliation defined by external audiences and their self-
identification with a given category to preserve their social wealth – conceived as the 
perceived endowment that the firm derives from fulfilling the expectations of a social system, 
in terms of values, norms, beliefs, and meanings – and/or access the economic benefits 
associated with selective conformity (Westphal & Bednar, 2008). We theorize different 
underlying rationales for conformity and focus on two in particular – conformity-in-
distinctiveness and distinctiveness-in-conformity – analyzing their prominence in family 
versus nonfamily firms. Conformity-in-distinctiveness occurs when firms with distinctive 
traits or attributes adhere more favorably to a behavior in their industry because their closest 
peers, or in-group members, have done the same. In contrast, distinctiveness-in-conformity 
occurs when firms align more favorably with a behavior when it is widespread among 
industry peers with attributes that depart from those featured by their closest peers. We 
suggest that family firms’ desire to preserve social wealth will lead them to follow a 
conformity-in-distinctiveness rationale, whereas nonfamily firms will seek positive 
recognition by conforming to a group of industry peers with distinctive features to accrue 
economic rewards from their distinctiveness-in-conformity. Moreover, as family firms are 
more vulnerable to negative assessments by relevant others and place greater value on 
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achieving legitimacy aside from any economic gains (Berrone et al., 2010), we argue that 
they are caught in a motivational asymmetry, such that propensity to conform will trigger 
more substantive behavioral responses in family firms than in nonfamily firms.  
Analyses with longitudinal data on new product introductions in a representative sample 
of Spanish manufacturing firms between 1998 and 2012 support our theoretical model, 
providing three contributions to the literature. First, we advance understanding of how family 
firms selectively navigate pressures to conform by exploiting the complementary explanatory 
power of the behavioral agency model and institutional theory. In doing so, we respond to 
recent calls for multi-theory approaches to fully understand family firm behavior (Miller & 
Le Breton-Miller, 2014). Second, we address concerns that current institutional theories do 
not fully explain variations in responses to institutional pressures (e.g., Berrone et al., 2010; 
Martins, 2005) by testing alternative mechanisms underlying conformity and showing that 
family and nonfamily firms respond heterogeneously to external social pressures, despite 
experiencing similar propensities to conform. Relatedly, we address the gap in research on 
conformity and distinctiveness in privately-held family firms, as most of prior research has 
focused on public firms where institutional pressures tend to prevail over the private interests 
of family owners and managers (e.g., Berrone et al., 2010; Engel, Hack, & Kellermanns, 
2015; Miller et al., 2013). Finally, we contribute to literature on innovation in family firms by 
suggesting that conformity pressures help maximize their innovation efficiency (Duran et al., 
2015; Patel & Chrisman, 2014). 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
Conformity, Distinctiveness and New Product Introduction in Family Firms 
The conformity-distinctiveness debate is particularly apparent in the context of 
innovation strategy. Firms introduce product innovations to move into new industries and try 
out new technologies, thereby facing substantial economic uncertainty (Greve & Taylor, 
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2000). At the same time, the introduction of a product innovation is a highly visible behavior 
that can trigger either positive or negative social assessments (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994).  
The behavioral agency model explains how loss-averse managers process information 
under conditions of risk and uncertainty (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998), suggesting that 
they are less concerned with maximizing future financial wealth than minimizing losses to 
present financial wealth, thereby protecting perceived wealth or reversing anticipated losses 
even at the expense of accepting greater risk (Wiseman & Gómez-Mejía, 1998). Extending 
the behavioral agency model to family firms, scholars have argued that family managers 
frame strategic choices depending on how these choices will affect the family’s accumulated 
stock of social, affective and emotional endowments deriving from the family’s controlling 
position in the firm, collectively labeled socioemotional wealth (SEW) (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2007), such that family firms are willing to bear greater economic risk and forgo potential 
financial gains to preserve their SEW. Hence, family firms are likely to bear the risk and 
uncertainty associated with new product introduction only if driven by the belief that such 
risk will be counterbalanced by the preservation of current SEW, leading to divergent 
behaviors and choices (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007).1 
Institutional theory provides an alternative explanation. This perspective emphasizes 
similarity vs. heterogeneity across organizations and within specific organizational fields 
(Ansari, Fiss, & Zajac, 2010; Deephouse, 1996, 1999), suggesting that to discern between 
legitimate and illegitimate organizations, external actors evaluate organizations through their 
displays of conformity (Bitektine, 2011; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). At the same time, they 
focus on what makes an organization different from others via social comparison to express 
                                                          
1New product introductions may also occur in response to industry normative prescriptions and social 
expectations that go beyond internal managerial preferences. Focusing on compliance with unequivocal 
environmental rules that have certain social benefits Berrone et al. (2010) show that family firms tend to 
substantively comply with institutional demands. Yet this behavior may not extend to the case of new product 
introductions that have uncertain social and economic benefits (Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt, & Lyman, 1990). 
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judgments on the specific behavioral attributes of firms and their ability to create value, i.e., 
their reputation (Deephouse & Carter, 2005; Whetten & Mackey, 2002). In this view, a new 
product introduction is driven by growing pressures for social conformity and legitimacy 
concerns, leading managers to behave according to taken-for-granted assumptions rather than 
conscious strategic choices (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 149). Scholars applying this 
perspective to family firms argue that their noneconomic goals and particularistic behaviors 
make them particularly unconventional in the eyes of outside stakeholders, creating powerful 
pressures to conform that transcend any single organization's purposive control (Bertrand & 
Schoar, 2006; Miller et al., 2013). For example, Miller et al. (2013) show that publicly traded 
family firms conform more assiduously along visible strategic dimensions. Also, a recent 
study by Engel et al. (2015) highlights that listed German family firms are more likely to 
adopt performance-related pay than other firms, even if this is not in line with family 
noneconomic goals. However, existing studies tend to treat conformity as a passive and 
monolithic response to external or institutional pressures, offering only limited insights into 
how social pressures may drive family firm motivations and propensity to engage in new 
product introduction. Table 1 offers an overview of the differences in focus between the 
behavioral agency model and institutional theory and their predictions about family firms’ 
responses to internal and external expectations.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
The divergence in focus between these theoretical perspectives highlights i) the external 
social environment’s active role in influencing managerial perceptions of loss and gain that 
behavioral agency theorists need to consider to understand risky choices going beyond purely 
economic considerations (Greve & Teh, 2017), and ii) the important role of managerial 
cognition, goals and preferences that institutional theorists need to acknowledge to graft a 
comprehensive model of strategic responses to external pressures. These complementary gaps 
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are even more evident in comparing findings in family business literature applying the 
behavioral agency model and institutional theory. Variations in the family’s stock of SEW 
depend on fulfilling the expectations of external audiences. In particular, positive social 
judgments may facilitate the controlling family achieving an idiosyncratic set of “socially 
worthy” noneconomic preferences (Berrone et al., 2010: 86). At the same time, family firms 
are a social reality and the social pressure exerted by stable widespread agreements on 
category meaning is a central tenet of research applying institutional theory. Thus, 
irrespective of the single organization’s goals and preferences, family firms will be subject to 
targeted social pressures (e.g., Engel et al., 2015; Miller et al., 2013) and will be more 
concerned with negative assessments of relevant others when considering the introduction of 
a new product.  
Balancing Conformity and Distinctiveness: Four Different Rationales for Conformity 
Some recent work has started exploring the complementarities between the behavioral 
agency and institutional theory perspectives proposing a more agent-based and cognitive 
view of conformity (e.g., George et al., 2006; Sharkey & Bromley, 2015). Recent research 
has shown that firms may have different propensities to conform and varying ways of doing 
so depending on whether they are more likely to see conformity as a way to avoid the threat 
of social disapproval and delegitimation or pursue the opportunity to reap the social gains 
associated with quality recognition (Durand & Kremp, 2016; Kennedy & Fiss, 2009). These 
motivational drivers for conformity depend on firm membership in one or multiple social 
categories (Cattani, Porac, & Thomas, 2017; Vergne & Wry, 2014) that segment and order 
the social structure of a field or industry, as well as firm owners’ and managers’ concerns for 
their own and their firm’s social identity (Leonardelli et al., 2011; Vergne & Wry, 2014). For 
example, Zhao et al. (2016) have recently suggested that conformity and distinctiveness are 
not necessarily mutually exclusive and optimal distinctiveness rests on the constant interplay 
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between managerial agency and stakeholder evaluation. Firms striving for optimal 
distinctiveness need to adapt to different and heterogeneous evaluation frameworks and be 
attuned to which organizational attributes external audiences use as dimensions of difference 
(Zhao et al., 2016). 
To theorize about these dimensions, we draw on the basic assumption that external 
stakeholders and audiences observe or impute to each firm certain characteristics based on 
visible aspects of behavior used as cues to enable themselves to answer questions about the 
firm’s identity (Vergne & Wry, 2014). These observed or imputed characteristics are then 
related to and interpreted in terms of a set of social categories (Zuckerman, 2016) that 
“represent a specific kind of collective typification, where audiences have abstracted from the 
uniqueness of individual organizations to form a type of similar organizations” (Cattani, 
Porac, & Thomas, 2017: 71). Corresponding to different social categories are differing sets of 
expectations that both enable and constrain managerial strategic choices and organizational 
responses (Durand & Paolella, 2013). Social categories, in turn, vary in their level of 
distinctiveness, which we refer to as the clarity and impermeability of the boundaries 
defining a given sub-group within a super-group and differentiating it from other out-groups 
at the same hierarchical level (Leonardelli et al., 2011). Based on the level of distinctiveness 
of a given social category to which a firm is assigned and the level of exclusiveness of a 
practice or behavior to such social category, we identify four different rationales for 
conformity as illustrated in Figure 1.  
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Conformity-in-conformity occurs when members of an inclusive group increase their 
propensity to follow a given behavior or adopt a given practice when the exclusiveness of 
such behavior to their own social category increases, which means when such behavior or 
practice is prevalently widespread among other in-group members. By contrast, 
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distinctiveness-in-conformity occurs when members of an inclusive group increase their 
likelihood to follow a given behavior when the proportion of in-group members enacting it 
decreases. Conformity-in-distinctiveness occurs when members of a distinct social group 
show a heightened propensity to engage in a behavior that is prevalently widespread among 
other in-group members. Finally, the members of distinct social categories that increase their 
propensity to engage in a behavior when the proportion of in-group members enacting it 
relative to out-group members decreases follow a distinctiveness-in-distinctiveness rationale 
for conformity. At the group-level, these rationales are incompatible and respond to different 
social motivations. In particular, conformity-in-conformity and conformity-in-distinctiveness 
primarily reflect the desire to avoid social losses due to being out of step with what has 
become legitimate within slightly and highly distinct social categories respectively. Members 
of slightly and highly distinct social categories who instead seek to improve their social 
standing and gain recognition by distinguishing themselves from other in-group members 
respectively follow the distinctiveness-in-conformity and distinctiveness-in-distinctiveness 
rationales. 
However, we expect that not all these rationales are equally likely. The more a group is 
perceived as distinct, the easier it will be for external audiences to benchmark category 
members’ behaviors against the prevailing categorical membership norms and hence the 
greater the pressure experienced by group members to abide by these norms, embracing a 
conformity-in-distinctiveness rationale (Bitektine, 2011; Durand & Paolella, 2013; Vergne & 
Wry, 2014). On the other hand, members of slightly distinct groups will face milder pressures 
to demonstrate compliance with categorical membership norms due to the absence of 
sufficiently impermeable category boundaries that allow external audiences to form clear 
expectations and exert conformity pressures within the social category (Vergne & Wry, 
2014). They will instead perceive the need to gain visibility and social recognition by 
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differentiating from other group members through distinctiveness-in-conformity (Leonardelli 
et al., 2011). In addition, a firm’s propensity to conform selectively will be affected by self-
categorization and subsequent self-identification within a given social category (Lounsbury 
& Glynn, 2001; Leonardelli et al., 2011). Social identity theory suggests that a firm’s 
tendency to identify with a group leads to adherence to group norms and homogeneity in 
attitudes and behavior (Ashforth & Mael, 1989).  
Varying Propensities to Conform in Family and Nonfamily Firms 
As family firms are largely perceived as having particularistic goals (Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2007), distinct governance structures (Miller et al., 2013) and resources (Habbershon & 
Williams, 1999), the presence of a controlling family and the active involvement of family 
members in ownership and management are often viewed as a distinct approach to business 
in the eyes of key stakeholders (Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999). The stereotypical family 
firm is assumed to be owned and managed by a group of family members, where the firm’s 
objectives are closely-linked to those of the family (Miller et al., 2013). As a consequence, 
audience members are likely to use family involvement in ownership and management as a 
relevant feature or segregating criterion, for grouping firms. As the family firm category is 
sufficiently marked in audience members’ mental models (Durand & Paolella, 2013), 
external constituents can construct beliefs about the behavior of family firms based on the 
behavioral dynamics emerging in the category. As a result, family firms may become 
particularly attentive and responsive to the behavior exhibited by other family firms to avoid 
social losses due to misalignment with other in-group members (Hannan, 2010).  
Attention to other family firms’ behaviors can also be driven by family members’ 
identification of the firm as a family firm (Zuckerman, 2016). Indeed, research on social 
identification in organizations suggests that a firm’s tendency to identify with a group is 
facilitated by the distinctiveness of the group’s attributes (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; 
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Leonardelli et al., 2011). Accordingly, prior studies have repeatedly shown that family 
owners and managers identify more strongly with their firm than nonfamily members 
(Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013). Thus, family firms are likely to experience a heightened 
need for in-group assimilation and inclusion that translates into increased propensity to 
conform. For instance, Fourné and Zschoche (2015) have shown that family firms attend to 
the behaviors of an idiosyncratic peer group that consists of family firm competitors. We thus 
suggest that when a product innovation has been predominantly introduced by family firms, 
other family firms may feel compelled to do the same, which is consistent with the 
conformity-in-distinctiveness rationale. This occurs because behaving differently from other 
family firms will increase the risk of incurring negative evaluations or being deemed 
unacceptable by outside constituents, jeopardizing their “socially worthy” noneconomic goals 
and eroding the family’s SEW. As such, the decision to introduce a new product will be 
largely driven by legitimacy concerns, with less consideration given to the economic 
implications.  
On the other hand, since nonfamily firms represent a less distinct social category, they 
are likely to experience less pressures to follow categorical membership norms, thereby being 
less conditioned in their decisions by social expectations and evaluations. Perhaps more 
importantly, nonfamily firms are less concerned with preserving firm legitimacy in itself and 
are likely to pay more attention to the economic implications of improving their social 
standing in the eyes of external stakeholders. As a result, nonfamily firms will more likely 
engage in behaviors that will possibly enhance both positive social evaluations and economic 
profits. Extending this logic to new product introductions, nonfamily firms will see the 
widespread introduction of a product innovation among family firms as an opportunity to 
gain visibility through association with family firms and thus increase the standing of their 
own firm in the industry by constituting themselves as “exemplary users” of the innovation in 
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their social group (Compagni, Mele, & Ravasi, 2015). This effect will be especially strong 
when other nonfamily firms have not yet adopted the product innovation. Therefore, 
nonfamily firms will be more likely to modulate their propensity to conform self-servingly by 
following strategic recipes less closely to their own social category through a distinctiveness-
in-conformity rationale (Deephouse, 1999).  
H1: As the exclusiveness of product innovation introductions to the focal firm’s 
ownership-based category increases, the likelihood of introducing a product innovation 
increases in family firms, whereas it decreases in nonfamily firms. 
 
In addition to ownership-based social categories, geographic boundaries also matter in 
audience members’ mental models, with geographical regions exhibiting “overarching” 
features that make them “durably distinct” (Molotch, Freudenburg, & Paulsen, 2000). 
Collectivities of geographically proximate and interdependent firms produce social identities 
resulting in shared norms, values and rules that exercise pressures on resident firms. Such 
norms are institutionalized through patterns of social and professional interactions, and 
generally accepted rules of the game that evolved over time (Pouder & St. John, 1996). In 
other words, local understanding, norms, and rules may serve to legitimize firm behavior 
(Marquis, Glynn, & Davis, 2007). Hence, the adoption of a conformity-in-distinctiveness 
rationale will be likely among firms operating in the same geographic region, as members of 
a common group characterized by a high degree of distinctiveness. Prior studies suggested 
that stakeholders tend to be segmented by geographic location, adopting unique logics and 
evaluative frameworks when judging firms and their legitimacy (Zhao et al., 2016). Greater 
social monitoring and exposure to audience members’ assessments at the local level will give 
rise to intense community pressures (Berrone et al., 2010) and discourage firms from 
deviating at the local level. As a result, the threat of losing legitimacy will lead family and 




However, community pressures are not uniform in their influence across resident firms. 
Greenwood et al. (2010) showed that although community effects on firm decisions influence 
all firms at the regional level, family firms are more willing to compromise their economic 
decisions to favor the community’s interest. At the regional level, where a firm’s visibility is 
relatively high and its conduct often subject to public scrutiny and media attention, family 
firms are likely to have a greater incentive to introduce a product innovation when other 
regional firms in the industry have done so, because the threat of delegitimation and the loss 
resulting from non-conformity loom larger due to the desire to preserve the family’s SEW 
(Berrone et al., 2010). By aligning with other firms in the region, family firms demonstrate 
their bona fides as community members and avoid sanctions and distrust from regional elites 
(Berrone et al., 2010; Greenwood et al., 2010). What is more, at the local level, family 
owners and managers tend to have strong social ties with their customers, suppliers, and 
bankers that become part of the stock of SEW to be preserved and transferred across 
generations (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005). Such social embeddedness within the 
community engenders a stronger sense of shared in-group identity in family firms that may 
lead to lock-in, generating loyalty from family members to the region-based group’s values 
and norms, and preventing them from attending to threats and opportunities beyond the 
boundaries of the group.  
On the other hand, as nonfamily firms are more concerned with anticipating the financial 
gains deriving from engaging in new product introduction as an externally validated and 
accepted behavior, we expect that at the regional level, nonfamily managers will try to 
position their firm to avoid social losses that could impair the firm’s current financial wealth 
and, at the same time, increase the likelihood of reaping future financial gains (Deephouse, 
1999). As a result, the tendency to abide by region-based categorical norms and follow a 
conformity-in-distinctiveness rationale will be weaker in nonfamily firms, especially when 
14 
 
they perceive that distinguishing themselves from other regional peers will not impair their 
firm’s current stock of financial wealth and will instead yield future financial gains. When 
this occurs, nonfamily firms may even opt for a distinctiveness-in-distinctiveness rationale. 
For example, Compagni, Mele, & Ravasi (2015) examined the diffusion of robotic surgery in 
the Italian healthcare system, showing that some firms framed the introduction of robotic 
surgery as an opportunity to the extent that its adoption would have helped them distinguish 
themselves from a geographically defined subset of comparable firms.  
H2: As the exclusiveness of product innovation introductions to the focal firm’s region-
based category increases, the likelihood of introducing a product innovation increases 
more in family firms than in nonfamily firms. 
Propensity to Conform and Behavioral Responses  
By adopting a given product innovation, firms demonstrate compliance with membership 
norms and ensure their legitimacy in the eyes of external constituents. However, pure 
alignment with membership norms rarely enables decision makers to gain recognition and 
improve their firm’s reputation: the more aligned an organization, the less it can stand out 
and gain recognition as a producer of quality (Deephouse & Carter, 2005; Durand & Kremp, 
2016). While nonfamily firms following a distinctiveness-in-conformity rationale can reap 
social benefits from improving their social standing in the group of closest peers, family 
firms following a conformity-in-distinctiveness rationale may struggle to achieve social gains 
in the form of recognizability of their offering, albeit forestalling the threat of a social loss. 
Thus, to be attested and rewarded as producers of quality, they need to send signals to 
audience members about their firm’s ability to provide value compared to their peers and 
rivals (Philippe & Durand, 2011). As a result, family firms will work more feverishly to 
solidify their social standing in the industry, using conformity to increase their reputation in 
the eyes of key constituents (Miller et al., 2013). Recent studies have shown that heightened 
identification between the family and the firm motivates family members to pursue social 
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gains, such as quality recognition and reputation (Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013). This leads 
to behaviors that demonstrate the congruence of the family firms’ actual actions with their 
expected behavior through substantive responses to institutional demands.  
For example, Kammerlander and Ganter (2015) showed that the pursuit of social gains in 
terms of improvements in the firm’s reputation fostered a pattern of highly intense adoption. 
Therefore, although family and nonfamily firms may experience similar propensities to 
conform by introducing a widespread product innovation among in-group or out-group 
members, such propensities may translate into more substantive actions and higher 
innovative outputs in family firms (Berrone et al., 2010). The positive perceptions of the 
social value of engaging in product innovation in family firms can have an "action-
generating" effect that facilitates not only the initial adoption of the practice but also its 
effectuation (Tolbert & Zucker, 1983). Additionally, the greater discretion to dispose, direct 
and allocate firm resources (Carney, 2005) is likely to entail superior ability to translate 
propensity to conform into actual responses (Chrisman et al., 2015) when such responses 
emphasize the congruence between the firm’s values and actions and those deemed 
appropriate by relevant stakeholders (Philippe & Durand, 2011). Conversely, nonfamily firms 
will have weak interest in enacting bold responses, especially when associated with 
unpredictable economic benefits, since the returns from the adoption of a distinctiveness-in-
conformity rationale will be sufficient to garner visibility and access critical resources 
(Westphal & Zajac, 1998).  
H3: The relationship between propensity to conform and number of new product 




 Our sample includes 2,338 Spanish manufacturing firms between 1998 and 2012, 
resulting in 12,426 firm-year observations across 20 manufacturing industries. Product 
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innovation data derive from the Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales (ESEE), a survey 
on business strategies assembled annually by the Spanish Fundacion Empresa Publica (Public 
Firm Foundation) through its Economics Research Program. All major manufacturing 
subsectors in NACE-CLIO R44 (the industry classification scheme commonly adopted in 
Europe) are represented. The focus on manufacturing industries is considered appropriate in 
the context of product innovations and conformity. Additionally, as regional communities are 
particularly pronounced in Spain, with the Constitution recognizing 17 historic regions, the 
Spanish context is particularly apt to investigate the influence of region-based categorical 
membership on the decision to introduce a product innovation (Greenwood et al., 2010).  
Dependent Variables 
Likelihood to Introduce a Product Innovation. We used a dummy variable capturing 
whether or not a firm introduced innovations in product functionalities and/or design – 
features that are clearly visible to audience members – in a given industry at time t. Visibility 
is a fundamental characteristic of an innovation that allows the firm to show its conformity 
and signal or prove its commitment to high quality.  
Number of New Products. A new product was defined as the introduction of an entirely 
new product showing changes in design characteristics and/or functionalities at t+1 (Katila, 
2002). Thus, products incorporating only new components and materials did not qualify as a 
new product.  
Independent Variables 
Family Firm. Following Greenwood et al. (2010), we used a binary measure of family 
firms distinguishing family firms (=1) from nonfamily firms (=0) based on majority 
ownership (>50%) and family involvement in management (e.g., Chrisman & Patel, 2012). 
As a robustness check, we also used an objective measure of family involvement in terms of 
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number of owners and owner’s relatives occupying top managerial positions in year t-1 (e.g., 
Kotlar et al., 2013). Results remained largely the same under this specification. 
Ownership-based Exclusiveness. To compute our measure, we calculated the number of 
other firms operating in the same industry as the focal firm in year t-1 with the same type of 
ownership that introduced at least one product innovation between year t-3 and t-1, divided 
by the total number of firms that introduced at least one product innovation between year t-3 
and t-1 in the industry, excluding the focal firm. We adopted two ownership categories based 
on the identity of shareholders holding 50 percent or more of company stock: family 
ownership and nonfamily ownership. We controlled for changes in ownership and industry 
by the focal organization between year t-1 and the current year. As a robustness check, we 
also ran our regressions using four ownership categories to define ownership-based groups: 
family ownership, (nonfamily) foreign ownership, state ownership, and mixed investors 
ownership. Results were largely consistent.  
Region-based Exclusiveness. To construct this measure, we coded each firm as located in 
one of Spain’s 17 regions. We then calculated the number of other firms operating in the 
same region and industry as the focal firm in year t-1 having introduced at least one product 
innovation between year t-3 and t-1 divided by the total number of firms that introduced at 
least one product innovation between year t-3 and t-1 in the industry, excluding the focal 
firm. We controlled for changes in location and industry by the focal firm between year t-1 
and the current year. Although we considered three years a reasonable period for an 
innovation to serve as a model for other firms, we tested the sensitivity of our results by 
estimating the models using other frequently-used time windows and confirming the 
robustness of our findings for two-, three- and four-year windows.  
Propensity to Conform. This explanatory variable to test H3 was derived from the model 
estimating the Likelihood to Introduce a Product Innovation as a firm’s marginal probability 
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of introducing a product innovation at time t in response to prior new product introductions 
by ownership-based and region-based group members.  
Control Variables 
We included several firm- and industry-level control variables lagged at t-1. We used 
Number of Adopters and their Average Performance to isolate “economically based rational 
accounts” for the decision to introduce a product innovation (Ansari, Fiss, & Zajac, 2010). 
Number of Adopters was a count variable capturing the number of all other firms adopting at 
least one innovation in the product’s design/functionalities in the prior three years and 
operating in the same industry as the focal firm. Adopters’ Average Performance was the 
average return on assets (ROA) of all other firms in the same industry as the focal firm 
introducing at least one product innovation in the prior three years. The introduction of a 
Product Innovation in year t-1 was included to capture learning effects (e.g., Srinivisan, 
Haunschild, & Grewal, 2007). Consistent with prior research (Greve, 2003), we also included 
Performance Feedback measured as the discrepancy between a firm’s ROA in year t-1 and 
the average ROA of firms in the manufacturing sector in year t-2, and the Slack Index based 
on the standardized mean of absorbed (working capital to sales ratio), unabsorbed (current 
assets to current liabilities ratio), and potential slack (equity to debt ratio). The lagged R&D 
Intensity controlled for routinized allocation of resources to R&D. The firm’s technical 
expertise was accounted as the total Number of Patents granted to a firm in year t-1 
(Srinivasan et al., 2007). Product Diversification was coded 1 if the organization offered 
more than one product across different manufacturing subsectors in year t-1, otherwise 0 
(Katila, 2002). Following prior studies, we used Firm Age (years since incorporation) to 
control for the possibility of entrenchment in family firms (Chrisman & Patel, 2012). We 
controlled for Firm Size using the log of sales. At the industry-level, we included two time-
varying variables capturing the level of environmental uncertainty and competition in year t-
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1, respectively. Environmental Uncertainty was measured as the change in the industry 
concentration ratio, accounted for by the four largest firms between year t-2 and t-1. 
Competition was measured as the industry density in year t-1. At the region-level, we 
included a time varying variable Family Firms Regional Presence capturing the number of 
family firms operating in the same region as the focal firm in year t-1. Year effects were 
included in all models, but the coefficients are not reported in the tables. 
Endogeneity. Since firms may introduce product innovations as a consequence of 
unobservable organizational or environmental characteristics not captured in the control 
variables, we used the Heckman two-stage procedure including the inverse Mill’s ratio in the 
models as a control variable (Shaver, 1998). We estimated a probit model for each period 
where the family firm is the endogenous variable (see, for example, Gomez-Mejia et al., 
2007; Kotlar et al., 2014). We then estimated the likelihood of a firm introducing a product 
innovation and number of new products using the inverse Mill’s ratio from the first stage as a 
control variable. In the first-stage model, we used five variables that could influence the 
attractiveness of continued family ownership and management, but not the decision to 
introduce a product innovation: the number of family members working as employees in the 
firm, whether the firm was privately listed, whether it was part of a corporate group or a 
cooperative, and the share of foreign equity. Firm age, size, year and industry dummies were 
also included in the first-stage model. 
Analytical Approach 
When analyzing panel data in which events occur repeatedly at discrete points in time, 
pooled cross-sectional logistic regression is the preferred method for event history analysis as 
it can handle tied events without making assumptions about the exact timing of an event 
(Allison, 1984; Yamaguchi, 1991). We expressed the logistic regression as a latent response 
model relating the dichotomous observed response (introduction of a product innovation ) to 
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a latent variable representing a firm’s propensity to introduce a product innovation (  using 
a threshold model. To relax the assumption of conditional independence among the responses 
for the same firm given the covariates, we implemented a three-level random intercept 
logistic model with time-points (level i(1)) nested in firms (level j(2)), nested in industries 
(level k(3)), a form of generalized linear mixed model (GLMM) which enables the overall 
level of firm propensity to introduce a product innovation to vary between clusters j and k 
below and above the variability explained by the covariates (Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, & 
Pickles, 2005). The industry-level random intercept induces dependence among firms in the 
same industry and the firm-level random intercept induces additional dependence among 
observations on the same firm. We specified the linear regression model for the latent 
response  as follows: 
 
 
Where is our family firm variable,  is a vector of variables describing the 
exclusiveness of product introduction to the focal firm’s ownership- and social-based groups. 
Vector  includes our control variables,  and  are the 
random intercepts, and is an error term. ,  and  are mutually 
independent, and independent of the explanatory variables. Our coefficients of interest are the 
sets  and  that represent the propensity to conform of nonfamily and family firms 
respectively based on the exclusiveness of new product introductions to the focal firm’s 
ownership- and region-based groups. To relax the assumption of independence of 
observations and obtain asymptotically consistent estimates even with heteroskedastic errors, 
we estimated robust standard errors using the Huber/White sandwich estimator. Hence, we 
estimated the average marginal probabilities to conform across family and nonfamily firms 
that we used as covariates in the model predicting number of new products (Gomez-Mejia et 
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al., 2007). To estimate the number of new products, we used a panel Poisson regression. The 
generalized estimating equations (GEE) regression method enables accounting for 
autocorrelation due to repeated yearly measures of the same firms and is common in new 
product introduction studies (e.g., Katila & Ahuja, 2002). To account for any over-dispersion 
in the data, we report the results with robust standard errors. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix for the variables across all years are 
presented in Table 2. Correlations between the various independent variables are all quite 
low. The highest correlation was -0.61 between ownership-based exclusiveness and family 
firm. Variance inflation factors for the independent variables in our models were below 2.5 
on average and individually below the suggested threshold of 10, indicating that 
multicollinearity was not a concern in the regressions.  
Insert Table 2 about here 
The results of our generalized linear mixed model predicting a firm’s likelihood to 
introduce a product innovation are shown in Table 3. The results must be interpreted 
conditionally on the random intercepts as random-intercept logistic regression fits subject-
specific or conditional probabilities for individual firms and industries. Model 1 includes the 
estimates for the control variables and serves as our baseline specification. The positive and 
significant coefficient for the number of prior adopters (β=0.02, p<.001) supports the view of 
institutional theory that widespread adoption of a practice contributes to its perceived 
legitimacy, thus creating normative pressures to adopt (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Conversely, we found no significant effect of the average performance of prior innovators on 
the likelihood of a firm introducing the product innovation (Haunschild & Miner, 1997).  
As the results across Models 2-5 were consistent in significance, only the full model, 
Model 5, is interpreted. The coefficient of the family firm variable was negative and 
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significant (β=-1.09, p<.01), suggesting that the likelihood of a family firm introducing a new 
product design or functionality in a given industry and year was 0.34 times2 that of a 
nonfamily firm in the same industry and year. We also found a negative and significant 
relationship between ownership-based exclusiveness of new product introductions and the 
likelihood of the focal firm introducing a product innovation (β=-1.18, p<.01). This result 
supports our prediction that nonfamily firm decision makers follow a distinctiveness-in-
conformity rationale and are more inclined to conform to the behavior of other firms with 
dissimilar ownership; whereas an increase in the proportion of peers belonging to their firm’s 
ownership category among prior innovators negatively affects their propensity to introduce 
the product innovation. The coefficient of the region-based exclusiveness variable was 
negative and not statistically significant, providing no evidence of a conformity-in-
distinctiveness rationale among nonfamily firms within region-based groups, and pointing 
instead to distinctiveness-in-distinctiveness.  
The coefficient of the interaction between family firm and ownership-based 
exclusiveness was positive and statistically significant (β=1.27, p<.05), indicating that family 
firms are more sensitive to the actions of other family firms than those of nonfamily firms. 
The coefficient of the interaction between family firm and region-based exclusiveness is also 
positive and marginally significant (β=1.00, p<.10): the likelihood of a firm introducing a 
product innovation in response to an increase in the proportion of innovators operating in the 
same region is greater if the firm is family owned and managed. Taken together, these results 
provide support for H1 and marginal support for H2. To better interpret these results, in 
Figures 1 and 2, we present the predictive margins of the two interaction effects by plotting 
the population-averaged or predicted marginal probabilities of introducing a product 
innovation against the levels of ownership-based exclusiveness (Figure 1) and region-based 
                                                          
2 = exp(-1.09) 
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exclusiveness (Figure 2) for family and nonfamily firms. As predicted, Figure 1 shows that 
while in family firms the increase in the number of firms in their same ownership category 
that introduced a product innovation in the past has a positive effect on the probability of the 
focal firm introducing the product innovation, in nonfamily firms this relationship is 
negative. Figure 2 shows that when the proportion of firms in the focal firm’s region-based 
group that introduced a product innovation in the prior three years increases, the slope of the 
regression line increases for family firms (dotted line) and decreases for nonfamily firms 
(solid line). Aside from indicating that family firms are more likely to abide by norms among 
peers located within the boundaries of their regional community, it points to a tendency in 
nonfamily firms to embrace a distinctiveness-in-distinctiveness rationale for conformity at the 
regional community-level.  
Insert Table 3, Figure 2 and Figure 3 about here 
Table 4 presents the results of the GEE Poisson regression analysis and tests H3 in 
relation to a firm’s propensity to conform at time t to the number of new products at t+1 in 
family versus nonfamily firms. The first column reports the baseline model. In Model 2, we 
introduced the propensity to conform at time t and the family variable, and in Model 3, we 
included the interaction between propensity to conform and family firm. H3, proposing a 
positive moderating effect of family involvement in ownership and management on the 
relationship between a firm’s propensity to conform and the number of new products, finds 
support in Model 3 (β=1.78, p<.01). Although the active involvement of family members in 
firm ownership and management has a negative effect on the number of new product 
introductions (β=-0.78, p<.05), it reinforces the positive effect of propensity to conform on 
the number of new product introductions. 
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Insert Table 4 about here 
Since prior research has found different responses to institutional pressures in publicly 
and privately held firms, we conducted a post-hoc analysis to test the behavior of private and 
public firms separately. While the findings for the sub-sample of privately held firms were 
largely consistent in magnitude, direction, and significance with those presented in the main 
analyses, for publicly held firms we found opposite results. In relation to H1, nonfamily firms 
embrace conformity-in-conformity by increasing their likelihood to engage in new product 
introductions when the proportion of nonfamily firms among prior adopters increases. Family 
firms embrace distinctiveness-in-distinctiveness, engaging in new product introduction with 
the exclusiveness of this behavior to nonfamily firms. When testing H2, we found that 
region-based audiences’ expectations are extremely relevant for public firms, which at the 
regional level modulate their propensity to conform according to conformity-in-
distinctiveness. However, we found no significant differences between public family vs. 
nonfamily firms’ responses to region-based social expectations.3 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we attempted to integrate the behavioral agency model and institutional 
theory predictions to explain differences in the introduction of new product innovations due 
to the existence of different motivations and propensity to conform between family and 
nonfamily firms (Compagni et al., 2015; Fourné & Zschoche, 2015). Drawing on 
contemporary developments of the concept of conformity in institutional theory and related 
literatures (e.g., Durand & Kremp, 2016; Philippe & Durand, 2011; Zhao et al., 2016), we 
conceived conforming behavior as a stylized fact induced by external pressure driven by the 
firm’s typification as a member of one or more social categories (Cattani et al., 2017; Vergne 
                                                          
3Ownership-based Exclusivenesst-1: β=4.64, p<.05; Family Firmt-1*Ownership-based Exclusivenesst-1: β=-9.75, 




& Wry, 2014), the goals of firm owners and managers, and their identification of the firm 
within a given social category (Leonardelli et al., 2011). We theorized four mutually 
exclusive rationales for conformity that firms may follow depending on the degree of 
distinctiveness of the firm’s social category in the eyes of external constituents, and on 
whether the trade-off between blending in or standing out relative to other category members 
tilts towards the former or the latter in the eyes of the firm’s internal constituents.  
Analyzing Spanish manufacturing firms and their likelihood of introducing a product 
innovation, we found that the avoidance of social losses takes higher priority in family firm 
decisions. Family managers orient their firms towards abiding by categorical membership 
norms, enacting behaviors aligned with those of peers, such as other family firms in the 
industry or industry peers operating in the same region. Conversely, nonfamily firms 
modulate their propensity to conform to seek quality comparisons rather than defend against 
the threat of social losses, trying to position themselves as different from other in-group 
members as legitimately as possible based on the prospect of achieving economic returns. 
However, our post-hoc analysis revealed that these motivations reverse in publicly held 
firms. Since key external stakeholders often regard public family firms with suspicion or as 
an unorthodox approach to business (Miller et al., 2013), the compelling need to demonstrate 
their bona fides and avoid being discounted as illegitimate leads family firms to deviate from 
their categorical membership norms and instead conform to widespread behaviors among 
nonfamily firms. Finally, we have shown that even when family and nonfamily firms are 
equally willing to conform, family firms’ perception of the decision to introduce new 
products as socially desirable creates a stronger incentive for them to innovate.  
Our study has major implications for future research across a variety of literature 
streams. First, it enriches and extends current family business literature by integrating 
behavioral agency and institutional theories to provide a better understanding of how family 
26 
 
firms differ from nonfamily firms in navigating the tension between conformity and 
distinctiveness, and how this can help explain different strategic choices between family and 
nonfamily firms in terms of product innovation introductions. Differences in the way family 
and nonfamily firms balance conformity and differentiation from others’ practices reside in 
the relationship between conformity and distinctiveness in family decision makers’ mental 
models compared to their nonfamily counterparts: while distinctiveness is the antecedent of 
conformity in family firms, distinctiveness is the expected outcome in nonfamily firms.  
Furthermore, by examining the differing effects of the propensity to conform on 
innovation outcomes between family and nonfamily firms, this study addresses the 
outstanding question in family firm research on how family firms are able to achieve higher 
innovation output despite lower R&D investments (Duran et al., 2015; Patel & Chrisman, 
2014). Patel and Chrisman (2014) observed that family firms can do so by changing type of 
R&D investments depending on firm performance. When firm performance exceeds 
expectations, family firms invest in exploitative R&D projects that reduce rather than 
increase the variability of sales, whereas they turn to explorative and variance-enhancing 
R&D investments when their performance is below aspirations. By adapting their R&D 
investment strategy more aggressively than nonfamily firms, family firms are able not only to 
reconcile their economic and noneconomic goals, but also increase the efficiency of their 
R&D investments in a way that possibly boosts innovative outputs. Our finding that family 
firms show higher levels of innovation output than nonfamily firms when the decision to 
introduce new products is perceived as socially desirable extends and complements the work 
of Patel and Chrisman (2014). We show that, paradoxically, the desire to appear in 
conformity with norms fuels innovation in family firms, thus breaking down psychological 
barriers to innovation and maximizing their innovation efficiency.  
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Second, by theorizing the existence of four different conformity rationales depending on 
the degree of distinctiveness of a given social category and the degree of exclusiveness of a 
practice or behavior to such social category, this study expands conformity theory with a 
model that applies to cases in which audiences evaluate conformity at multiple levels and 
along multiple dimensions. Our findings suggest that conformity is not only a response to the 
organizational imperative to avoid the threat of delegitimation, but also a way for firms to 
differentiate from peers by focusing resources on some salient attributes of their field or 
industry to reap a large share of the benefits from distinctiveness (e.g., Durand & Kremp, 
2016). By showing that firms modulate their propensity to conform depending on both 
external expectations and internal goals, our research also responds to recent calls to redirect 
the study of institutional and social accounts of adoption towards finer-grained mechanisms 
that spawn and are influenced by the heterogeneity of actors and activities that underlie 
apparent conformity (Lounsbury, 2007). Our findings indicate that firm behavior is guided by 
individual preferences and external constraints, as well as by individual perceptions of external 
constraints (Oliver, 1991). In other words, the combination of conformity at the super-group 
level (industry) with either conformity or deviation at the sub-group level (e.g., ownership-
based or region-based group) reflects how individual decision makers resolve the tension 
between their personal interests and the expectations of external audiences.  
Third, by showing that family and nonfamily firms respond heterogeneously to external 
social pressures despite experiencing similar propensities to conform, our study addresses the 
concern in extant literature that current institutional theories do not fully answer questions on 
variation in responses to institutional pressures (Berrone et al., 2010; Martins, 2005). Relatedly, 
we show that the way in which propensity to conform translates into actual behavior is driven 
by existing alignment between owners’ preferences and external constituents’ demands. 
Finally, the results of the post-hoc analysis enrich the discussion on differences in 
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conforming behavior between public and private firms. The few empirical studies available 
examining the differences in conforming behavior between family and nonfamily firms focus 
on publicly traded firms (e.g., Berrone et al., 2010; Engel et al., 2015; Fourné & Zschoche, 
2015; Miller et al., 2013), leaving a gap in understanding how such behavior, its underlying 
motivations and mechanisms vary across family and nonfamily privately held firms. Broadly 
speaking, our findings support the idea that publicly held firms are more concerned with 
avoiding social losses, seeking approval from external audiences by coalescing around the 
behaviors of the category of which they claim to be members.  
Limitations and Future Research Opportunities  
Although our theoretical arguments are based on social accounts for the adoption of a 
particular innovation, we cannot completely rule out rational accounts associated with 
maximizing economic benefits (Ansari et al., 2010). For instance, family firms could 
conform more favorably to region-based and ownership-based group members in the attempt 
to minimize search costs and reduce the risks associated with experimentation as geographic 
proximity and ownership similarity may be informative of the fit between the characteristics 
of an innovation and the needs, objectives and structures of the adopting firm. Qualitative 
inquiry could offer a more detailed analysis of the cognitive and motivational factors driving 
innovation introduction in response to external influences and pressures in family firms.  
Furthermore, additional work is needed to examine the interaction between institutional 
demands and organizational owners’ and managers’ goals and preferences. For instance, 
future research could delve deeper into how differently family and nonfamily firms perceive 
and respond to internal external pressures in the presence of competing institutional logics or 
multiple audiences (De Massis et al., 2016; Pontikes, 2012; Zhao et al., 2016). A refinement 
of our model could test the importance of audience heterogeneity as a moderator of 
propensity to conform in family and nonfamily firms.  
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Finally, although family firms represent a rather distinct category due to their 
motivational, cognitive and behavioral particularities, disagreement among audiences on 
which attributes enter the category’s definition could lessen conformity pressures and free 
family firms to deviate from categorical membership norms. It would be interesting to 
investigate how family firms across different social categories modulate their propensity to 
conform to in-group and out-group norms. For instance, Miller et al. (2013) showed that 
differences in the governance roles of family members – specifically major family presence 
in ownership, board membership, and management especially after the first generation – 
affect the degree of strategic conformity in family firms. Future research could refine our 
understanding of the antecedents and consequences of conformity and distinctiveness in 
family firms by investigating heterogeneity of family firm behaviors across and within 
different sub-groups.  
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Comparison of Behavioral Agency Model and Institutional Theory and Respective 
Predictions on New Product Introduction in Family Firms 
 
Behavioral agency model (BAM) 
(Wiseman and Gómez-Mejía, 1998) 
Institutional theory 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) 
Focus  Executives risk taking 
 Managerial self-interest 
 Internal goals 
 Conformity as a source of legitimacy 
 Isomorphic pressures in structured 




 Individual firm level  Organizational and organizational field 
level 
Agency  Inwardly-directed agency at the 
individual level 
 Limited externally-oriented agency at 
the organizational level in relation with 
the external environment 
Motivation  Loss aversion  External pressures 
Predictions  Self-interested individuals are less 
concerned with maximizing future 
financial wealth than minimizing 
losses to present financial wealth, 
thereby protecting perceived wealth or 
reversing anticipated losses even at the 
expenses of accepting greater risk. 
 Firms adopt practices that match 




 Family firms exhibit distinctive and 
anomalous strategic choices because 
family managers are more concerned 
with protecting the family’s current 
stock of socioemotional wealth rather 
than the firm’s financial wealth (e.g., 
Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia 
et al., 2007; Zellweger et al., 2011).  
 The pursuit of noneconomic goals and 
the enactment of particularistic 
strategic choices, make family firms 
particularly unconventional in the eyes 
of outside stakeholders, creating 
powerful pressures to conform (Engel 






 Family firms will be likely to bear the 
risk and uncertainty associated with 
new product introduction only if they 
believe that such risk will be necessary 
to protect the family’s stock of 
socioemotional wealth. 
 Family firms will be likely to introduce 
a new product if this decision 
represents a “taken-for-granted” and 





Meansa, Standard Deviations and Correlationsb 
 
Variable Mean s. d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 




0.17 0.38 0.22 1.00                    
3 Propensity to Conform t 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.58 1.00                   








0.16 0.15 0.00 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.03 1.00                




34.06 16.84 0.03 0.10 0.20 -0.06 0.01 -0.07 -0.08 1.00              
9 
Product Innovation 
Introduction t-1  
0.22 0.41 0.19 0.57 0.88 -0.10 0.08 0.08 -0.03 0.11 1.00             
10 
Social Performance 
Feedback t-1≤ 0 
-0.09 0.14 -0.01 0.03 0.05 0.04 -0.03 0.02 -0.06 -0.02 0.03 1.00            
11 
Social Performance 
Feedback t-1> 0 
0.08 0.26 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.07 0.00 -0.03 0.19 1.00           
12 Slack Index t-1 0.02 1.79 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.09 1.00          
13 R&D Intensity t-1 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.18 0.30 -0.08 0.06 0.06 -0.11 0.03 0.20 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 1.00         
14 Number of Patents t-1 0.51 6.16 0.00 0.03 0.06 -0.04 0.05 0.09 -0.02 0.05 0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.23 1.00        
15 Product Diversification t-1 0.21 0.56 -0.01 0.05 0.10 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 1.00       
16 Firm Age  28.58 21.38 0.01 0.09 0.18 -0.14 0.11 0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.10 0.02 -0.04 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.00 1.00      
17 Firm Size t-1 15.91 1.99 0.05 0.25 0.52 -0.42 0.34 0.06 -0.07 0.03 0.27 0.10 -0.05 -0.09 0.16 0.11 0.06 0.36 1.00     
18 Market Competition t-1 108.42 51.47 0.00 -0.05 -0.09 0.09 -0.12 -0.11 -0.06 0.59 -0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.05 -0.04 -0.09 1.00    
19 Market Uncertainty t-1 7.80 18.11 0.00 0.04 0.08 -0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.07 -0.01 1.00   
20 
Family Firms Regional 
Presencet-1 
85.09 54.73 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.13 -0.07 0.57 -0.01 -0.06 0.04 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.05 -0.01 0.08 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 1.00  
21 Inverse Mills 1.56 1.45 0.04 0.19 0.41 -0.57 0.44 0.03 -0.03 0.12 0.19 0.00 -0.05 -0.06 0.13 0.07 0.03 0.28 0.71 -0.11 0.07 -0.13 1.00 
 
N= 12426; Firm n=2338 
a Means reflect non-mean-centered values. 





Estimated Parameters and Robust Standard Errors for Random-Intercept Logit Models for 
Introduction of Product Innovations 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Fixed part   
   
Family Firmt-1  -0.27* -0.91* -0.48** -1.09** 
 
 (0.13) (0.38) (0.18) (0.40) 
Ownership-based Exclusivenesst-1  -0.57* -1.16** -0.60* -1.18** 
 
 (0.25) (0.44) (0.25) (0.45) 
Region-based Exclusiveness t-1  -0.02 -0.02 -0.42 -0.43 
 
 (0.45) (0.46) (0.55) (0.52) 







  (0.64) 
 
(0.65) 
Region-based Exclusiveness x Family Firmt-1     
1.13† 1.00† 
   
 
(0.59) (0.58) 
Number of Adopters t-1 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Adopters’ Average Performance t-1 0.23 0.19 0.04 0.18 0.03 
 
(0.68) (0.67) (0.64) (0.68) (0.65) 
Product Innovation t-1 2.35*** 2.35*** 2.36*** 2.36*** 2.36*** 
 
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Social Performance Feedback t-1≤ 0 0.74* 0.77* 0.78* 0.78* 0.79** 
 
(0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.30) 
Social Performance Feedback t-1> 0 -0.34† -0.34† -0.35† -0.35† -0.35* 
 
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
Slack Index t-1 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
R&D Intensity t-1 10.11*** 10.13*** 10.39*** 10.17*** 10.42*** 
 
(2.40) (2.40) (2.40) (2.38) (2.28) 
Number of Patents t-1 -0.01*** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Product Diversification t-1 0.11* 0.11* 0.11* 0.11* 0.12* 
 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Firm Age -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Firm Size t-1 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 0.39*** 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
Market Competition t-1 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Market Uncertainty t-1 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Family Firms Regional Presencet-1 0.00*** 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Inverse Mills -0.10† -0.11† -0.11† -0.11* -0.11* 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) 
Constant -10.08*** -9.60*** -9.22*** -9.48*** -9.11*** 
 (0.78) (0.83) (0.76) (0.80) (0.72) 
Random part   
   Firm  1.10*** 1.10*** 1.10*** 1.10*** 1.10*** 
 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) 
Industry 0.24** 0.23** -0.19† 0.22** -0.19† 
 
(0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) 
df 28 31 32 32 33 
Log-likelihood -3642.91 -3639.32 -3637.69 -3637.18 -3635.61 
Likelihood ratio χ² 
df (vs. Model #) 
 7.19* 
3 (vs M1) 
10.44* 
4 (vs M1) 
11.46* 
4 (vs M1) 
14.60** 
5 (vs M1) 
Wald Test for interactions χ² (df)   3.82*(1) 3.66†(1) 6.30*(2) 
Note: 
N= 12426; Firm n=2338; Industry n=20  
Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses. All models also control for year. 





Results of GEE Regression Analysis for Number of New Products 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Propensity to Conformt-1  2.28*** 1.78*** 
 
 (0.48) (0.46) 
Family Firmt-1  -0.19 -0.78* 
 
 (0.23) (0.31) 
Propensity to Conform x Family Firmt-1     1.68* 
 
   (0.68) 
Number of Adopters t-1 -0.01 -0.01* -0.02** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Adopters’ Average Performance t-1 -1.31 -1.14 -1.25 
 
(1.30) (1.28) (1.34) 
Product Innovation t-1 2.19*** 2.53*** 2.44*** 
 
(0.21) (0.25) (0.25) 
Social Performance Feedback t-1≤ 0 -0.04 -0.13 -0.11 
 
(0.37) (0.46) (0.46) 
Social Performance Feedback t-1> 0 -0.52* -0.51* -0.48† 
 
(0.25) (0.26) (0.26) 
Slack Index t-1 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
R&D Intensity t-1 1.90† 1.10 0.99 
 
(1.14) (1.27) (1.30) 
Number of Patents t-1 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Product Diversification t-1 -0.11 -0.33** -0.32** 
 
(0.09) (0.12) (0.12) 
Firm Age 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Firm Size t-1 0.10 -0.08 -0.09 
 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09) 
Market Competition t-1 0.00 0.01* 0.01* 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Market Uncertainty t-1 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Family Firms Regional Presencet-1 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Inverse Mills -0.12 -0.11 -0.09 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) 
Constant -1.90 0.63 1.04 
 (1.22) (1.43) (1.38) 
df 24 25 27 
Wald χ² 633.64*** 681.20*** 661.16*** 
QIC 76388.87 57310.27 57074.07 
Wald Test for interactions χ²   6.21**  
Note: 
N=9872; Firm n=2056 
Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses. All models also control for year. 
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